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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—ELECTIONS: 
CITIZENS DIVIDED:  BALANCING THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH AND THE ROLE OF PRIVATE 
CORPORATIONS IN OUR NATION’S ELECTIONS 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 
130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) 
ABSTRACT 
 
In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the United States 
Supreme Court lifted a decades-long ban on independent corporate political 
expenditures.  An ideologically-divided Court delivered a 5-4 split decision 
overturning Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce and part of 
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, ruling the provision of the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 that prohibited all independent 
expenditures made by corporations, particularly those in support or 
opposition of a candidate, is a violation of the First Amendment.  The Court 
ruled further, however, that the disclosure and disclaimer provisions of the 
Act did not violate the First Amendment, but served the public by providing 
information.  Currently, the North Dakota Century Code bars a corporation 
from making a direct contribution to aid any candidate for public office or 
for any political purpose—a rule that will be significantly impacted, if not 
repealed, by the Citizens United decision.  In North Dakota, the Citizens 
United decision will likely have a considerable impact on the role of 
corporations in future elections. 
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I. FACTS 
In 2008, Citizens United, a nonprofit corporation, released a documen-
tary entitled Hillary:  The Movie (Hillary), which was critical of then-
senator Hillary Clinton and her effort to seek the Democratic nomination 
for President of the United States.1  The documentary was distributed in 
theaters and on DVD, and in order to increase its audience, Citizens United 
sought to release the documentary through video-on-demand.2  In order to 
promote the program, Citizens United produced three advertisements, 
which it desired to pay for and show on cable and broadcast television thirty 
days before the primary election.3 
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), which amend-
ed the Federal Election Campaign Act, prohibits a corporation from using 
funds from its general treasury to make direct contributions or independent 
 
1. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 886-87 (2010). 
2. Id. at 887.  Video-on-demand allows a viewer to watch a program at any time through a 
digital cable subscription. Id. 
3. Id. at 887-88. 
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expenditures in support or opposition of any candidate.4  Additionally, as 
amended, the BCRA prohibits any “electioneering communication.”5  Un-
der the Act, an “electioneering communication” is “any broadcast, cable, or 
satellite communication that refers to a clearly identified candidate for 
Federal office” made within thirty days of a primary election or sixty days 
of a general election and is publicly distributed.6  Citizens United feared 
both the documentary and its promotional advertisements would fall under 
the BCRA’s section 441(b) ban on corporate independent expenditures and 
sought an injunction in federal district court against the Federal Election 
Commission (FEC).7 
Citizens United argued BCRA section 441(b) was unconstitutional as 
applied to Hillary and the disclosure and disclaimer requirements of BCRA 
sections 2018 and 3119 were unconstitutional as applied10 to Hillary and its 
promotional advertisements.11  The district court denied Citizens United’s 
motion for a preliminary injunction and granted summary judgment in favor 
of the FEC.12  On appeal, Citizens United raised two major issues while 
maintaining that various BCRA provisions, as applied, violated its First 
Amendment rights.13  First, Citizens United questioned whether BCRA sec-
tion 441(b), which prohibited corporate independent political expenditures, 
was constitutional as applied to Hillary.14  Second, the corporation ques-
tioned whether the disclaimer and disclosure requirements under BCRA 
sections 201 and 311 were constitutional as applied to Hillary.15  Before 
addressing either issue, the Court requested the parties first address whether 
it should overrule two earlier decisions:  Austin v. Michigan Chamber of 
Commerce,16 which held political speech may be banned based on a 
 
4. Id. (citing 2 U.S.C. § 441(b) (2000); 2 U.S.C. § 441(b)(2) (2006)). 
5. Id. 
6. Id. (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A); 11 C.F.R. § 100.29(a)(2) (2009)). 
7. Id. at 888. 
8. BCRA section 201 requires any person who spends in excess of $10,000 on electioneering 
communications must file a disclosure statement with the FEC. Id. at 914 (citing 2 U.S.C. 
§ 434(f)(1)). 
9. BCRA section 311 requires the inclusion of a disclaimer to any televised electioneering 
communication funded by anyone other than a candidate acknowledging the person or organiza-
tion responsible for the advertisement. Id. at 913-14 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 441d(d)(2)). 
10. An “as applied” challenge is one “claiming that a law or governmental policy, though 
constitutional on its face, is unconstitutional as applied, usually because of a discriminatory 
effect.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 261 (9th ed. 2009). 
11. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 888. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. at 888, 893. 
14. Id. at 888. 
15. Id. 
16. 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
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speaker’s corporate identity; and McConnell v. Federal Election 
Commission,17 which relied on Austin to uphold a facial challenge to limits 
on electioneering communications, in order to assess whether Citizens 
United’s claims could be resolved on narrower grounds.18 
Before addressing the district court’s ruling, the Supreme Court first 
held the application of BCRA section 441(b) could not be resolved on 
narrower grounds as applied to Hillary without chilling political speech and 
that it had to consider its holding in Austin.19  Next, the Court overruled 
Austin, thus leaving no foundation for a limit on corporate independent 
expenditures.20  The Court’s ruling rendered invalid the section 441(b) 
prohibition on corporate independent expenditures, as well as the portion of 
McConnell that upheld such restrictions, stating such a prohibition is “an 
outright ban on speech.”21  Finally, affirming the district court’s decision, 
the Supreme Court upheld the disclaimer and disclosure requirements of 
BCRA sections 201 and 311, noting such requirements “may burden the 
ability to speak, but impose no ceiling on campaign-related activities or pre-
vent anyone from speaking.”22 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Citizens United is not the first case to challenge a federal elections 
statute, nor will it likely be the last.23  The history of elections law in the 
United States has shown frequently that, as elections statutes are created, 
many legal challenges have resulted, thereby shaping elections law.24  The 
Citizens United decision addresses, relies on, and even overturns some of 
the many legal challenges to federal elections statutes over the years.25 
A. FEDERAL ELECTION LAW BEFORE CITIZENS UNITED 
Regulation of corporate political expenditures in American law dates 
back to the early twentieth century.26  In 1907, Congress enacted a law that 
 
17. 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
18. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 888. 
19. Id. at 888-96. 
20. Id. at 892-96. 
21. Id. at 913. 
22. Id. at 885 (syllabus) (internal citations omitted). 
23. See id. at 886-87. 
24. Id. at 900-01. 
25. Id. at 913. 
26. See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 115-22 (2003) (providing an 
extensive history of campaign finance reform in the United States). 
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became the foundation of major campaign reform.27  The law, known as the 
Tillman Act, prohibited any national bank or corporation from making 
monetary contributions in connection with any federal election.28  Shortly 
thereafter, Congress amended the statute, with the Federal Corrupt Practices 
Act of 1925, to include disclosure requirements and expenditure limits.29 
In 1943, the Smith-Conally Act extended the limit on contributions by 
corporations to include unions and labor organizations, and the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act of 1947 made permanent this extension.30  In order 
to prevent organizations from circumventing the law by making contribu-
tions independent of candidates, the Taft-Hartley Act strengthened the pro-
hibition on contributions by also including a prohibition on expenditures in 
connection with an election.31  The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 
(FECA) was an answer to inadequacies of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act 
and rising campaign costs.32  FECA created a framework for campaign 
financing regulation by limiting personal contributions, establishing a ceil-
ing on media expenditures, and requiring full public disclosure of receipts 
and expenditures.33  FECA also provided the legislative framework for 
corporations and union organizations to create separate segregated funds, or 
political action committees, for their political purposes.34 
In 1974, on the wake of political financing abuse stemming from the 
Watergate scandal, Congress amended FECA to create stringent regulatory 
policy by setting campaign spending limits, individual contribution limits, 
and limits on aggregate individual contributions.35  The amendments also 
limited independent expenditures on behalf of a candidate and created the 
Federal Election Commission as a centralized agency to administer and 
enforce campaign law.36  In 2002, the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 
(BCRA), commonly known as the McCain-Feingold Act, was adopted to 
 
27. ANTHONY CORRADO ET AL., THE NEW CAMPAIGN FINANCE SOURCEBOOK 12 (2005) 
(citing Tillman Act, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864 (1907), amended by Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 
ch. 368, 43 Stat. 1070 (1925) (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 241-248) (repealed 1972)). 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 13 (discussing Federal Corrupt Practices Act, ch. 368, 43 Stat. 1070 (1925) 
(codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 241-248) (repealed 1972)). 
30. Id. at 17 (discussing Smith-Connally amendment to War Labor Disputes Act, ch. 144, 57 
Stat. 163 (1943) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 251) (repealed 1945)); Labor Management Relations Act, 
ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1943) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.)). 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 20 (discussing Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 
Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.; 18 U.S.C.; 47 U.S.C.)). 
33. Id. at 20-21. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 22 (discussing Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 
93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.; 18 U.S.C.)). 
36. Id. 
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curb a surge of previously unregulated issue advertisements.37  These adver-
tisements advocated for a particular issue without containing the “magic 
words” urging citizens to “vote for, elect, support, or defeat” particular can-
didates or measures.38  As a result, the BCRA created a new prohibition on 
“electioneering communications,” or those broadcasts that clearly identified 
a candidate for office, aired within a specific time period, and targeted a 
specific audience of 50,000 or greater.39  Under the BCRA, corporations 
were prohibited from making independent expenditures for such election-
eering communications.40 
B. RELEVANT CASE LAW 
While the Citizens United decision implicated a number of free speech 
limitations on certain federal campaign contribution regulations, it was not 
the first instance where such restrictions were addressed by the Supreme 
Court.41  Shortly after the FECA amendment, the corporate contribution and 
expenditure provisions, as well as the disclosure requirements of the Act, 
were constitutionally challenged in Buckley v. Valeo.42  FECA expressly 
limited contributions to candidates for federally elected office by indivi-
duals or groups, limited expenditures by individuals or groups “relative to a 
clearly identified candidate,” and required detailed disclosure statements of 
contributions made.43  The Court held the provision placing a ceiling on 
direct contributions made by individuals and corporations, as well as the 
disclosure requirement provision, were constitutional because they protect 
against the appearance of improper influence of large campaign contribu-
tions and safeguard the electoral process without violating the rights of 
citizens.44  However, the Court invalidated the Act’s ceiling on independent 
and overall expenditures because those provisions limited the political 
expression found “at the core of . . . the First Amendment freedoms.”45 
Just two years later, in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,46 the 
Supreme Court held regulations that prohibit corporations from influencing 
 
37. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 132 (2003) (citing Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441b)). 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 893 (2010). 
42. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
43. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 7. 
44. Id. at 68. 
45. Id. at 39 (citing Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968)). 
46. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
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state referenda violate the First Amendment.47  In Bellotti, banking associa-
tions and business corporations wished to spend their funds to publicly 
express their views in opposition of a personal income tax proposal.48  A 
Massachusetts statute, however, prohibited the banking associations and 
other specified business corporations from making contributions or expen-
ditures aiding or promoting the election of any person or influencing a 
referendum vote.49  The Supreme Court invalidated the statute, stating it 
hindered the liberty to publicly and truthfully discuss all matters of public 
concern, which is the very speech the First Amendment was meant to 
protect.50 
In Federal Election Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 
Inc. (MCFL)51 the Supreme Court held FECA section 316, which prohibited 
direct expenditures of corporate funds in connection with any election, 
violated the First Amendment as applied to a nonprofit corporation.52  The 
Court reasoned in order to be subject to FECA’s prohibition, an expenditure 
must be the equivalent of “express advocacy.”53  MCFL also provided 
characteristics that may exempt an entity from the regulation, such as a 
corporation that was formed for the purpose of promoting political ideas, 
has no shareholders with a stake in its earnings, and was not established and 
does not receive contributions from a business corporation.54 
In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,55 the Supreme Court 
rejected a First Amendment challenge to section 54(1) of the Michigan 
Campaign Finance Act, which prohibited corporations from using general 
funds for independent expenditures in support or opposition of any candi-
date for state office.56  The Court ruled that, under MCFL, the Act did, in 
fact, burden political expression, but was justified in doing so by the com-
pelling governmental interest of preventing corruption in the political arena 
because amassed corporate wealth may unfairly influence election out-
comes in the form of independent expenditures.57  The Court noted section 
 
47. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 767. 
48. Id. at 771. 
49. Id. at 768. 
50. Id. at 795.  Interestingly, Justice Stevens sided with the majority when it came to 
upholding corporate expenditures influencing referenda votes in Bellotti, but three decades later he 
spoke out against such expenditures relative to candidates for elections.  See Citizens United v. 
Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 929 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
51. 479 U.S. 238 (1986). 
52. MCFL, 479 U.S. at 241. 
53. Id. at 249. 
54. Id. at 264. 
55. 494 U.S. 652 (1990). 
56. Austin, 494 U.S. at 655. 
57. Id. 
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54(1) was precisely targeted to eliminate the distortion caused by corporate 
spending, but still allowed for a corporation’s expression of its political 
views by expenditures through separate segregated funds.58  Thus, the 
restriction was sufficiently narrowly tailored to achieve its objective.59  
Finally, the Court rejected the argument the statute could not be constitu-
tionally applied to a nonprofit corporation, noting Hillary did not satisfy the 
three critical characteristics under MCFL that may exempt the corporation 
from the restriction.60  The Court observed the chamber’s purpose was not 
narrowly focused on the promotion of political ideas, its members included 
those who may disagree with its political activity, and, because its members 
were made up of business corporations, the chamber was not independent 
from the influence of such entities.61  The dissenting opinions authored by 
Justices Scalia and Kennedy in Austin, greatly foreshadowed the reasoning 
of the Citizens United majority.62 
Shortly after the BCRA was enacted, its constitutional validity was 
challenged.63  In McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, the Supreme 
Court upheld the BCRA’s regulation of electioneering communications, just 
as the Court previously upheld express advocacy in MCFL.64  The Court 
extended the MCFL rule, which previously applied only to express advo-
cacy, to any electioneering communications, relying on the anti-distortion 
interest recognized by the Court in Austin.65  The Court noted corporations 
were still free to organize separate segregated funds in order to make 
political expenditures, thus refusing to consider the regulation a “complete 
ban” on expression.66 
In Federal Election Commission v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. 
(WRTL),67 the Supreme Court relied on the McConnell “functional equiva-
lent” test to create an “as applied” exception to BCRA section 203.68  
WRTL challenged BCRA section 203, which made it a federal crime for any 
 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 662-64. 
61. Id. at 664-65. 
62. Compare Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 679 (1990) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting), and Austin, 494 U.S. at 695 (Kennedy, J., dissenting), with Citizens United v. Fed. 
Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 929 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority 
opinion as “essentially an amalgamation of resuscitated dissents”). 
63. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 114 (2003). 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 204. 
66. Id. The Citizens United majority did, however, refer to the same regulation as a “ban on 
speech.” Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 898. 
67. 551 U.S. 449 (2007). 
68. WRTL, 551 U.S. at 456. 
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corporation to broadcast any communication that names a federal candidate 
for elected office and is targeted to the electorate, with a number of adver-
tisements that encouraged voters to urge their elected Senators to oppose a 
filibuster.69  The Court held the advertisements could not be reasonably 
interpreted as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate and thus 
were not the functional equivalent of express advocacy under McConnell; 
therefore, BCRA section 203 was unconstitutional as applied in WRTL.70 
III. ANALYSIS 
The Citizens United majority abandoned its previous decisions in 
Austin and McConnell by allowing corporations to make independent 
political expenditures, thereby paving the way toward a new chapter in 
campaign contributions by corporations.71  The Court upheld the disclaimer 
and disclosure statements required by federal law, however, as regulations 
that further the public’s knowledge, thus bolstering political speech.72  
Chief Justice Roberts concurred, defending the majority’s turn from 
previous decisions,73 while Justice Stevens, in his dissent, expressed his 
concern of the Court’s stray from precedent, as well as his apprehension 
toward the potential for unlimited corporate spending, and his fear of 
political corruption as a result.74 
A. MAJORITY OPINION 
In its 5-4 split decision, primarily along ideological lines, the Supreme 
Court struck down nearly two decades of restrictions on corporate political 
contributions.75  Justice Kennedy authored the majority opinion, in which 
Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, and Justice Alito joined.76  Justice 
Thomas joined the majority as to all but Part IV, regarding disclaimer and 
disclosure requirements.77 
The Citizens United Court first considered whether the claims might be 
resolved on an as applied basis, limited to the facts presented, or whether 
the Court needed to invalidate earlier precedent.78  In its reasoning, the 
 
69. Id. at 460. 
70. Id. at 481-82. 
71. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 886. 
72. Id. at 914. 
73. Id. at 917 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
74. Id. at 929 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
75. Id. at 886. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 888. 
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Court tossed aside Citizens United’s narrower argument that, among others, 
Hillary did not qualify as an “electioneering communication” or as the 
“functional equivalent of express advocacy” because it was an appeal, 
shown on television, to vote against a specific federal candidate, made with-
in thirty days of a primary election.79  The Court held the case could not be 
resolved as applied because Hillary could be considered either an election-
eering communication or an independent expenditure; hence, the Court had 
to consider its decisions in Austin and McConnell and the facial validity of 
the restriction on corporate expenditures, which chilled political speech 
“central to the meaning and purpose of the First Amendment.”80 
In its consideration of the facial challenge of section 411(b), the Court 
noted a prohibition on corporate expenditures is a ban on speech, thus 
reducing overall political expression by restricting “the number of issues 
discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience 
reached.”81  The Court noted, “Laws that burden political speech are 
‘subject to strict scrutiny,’” and thus applied strict scrutiny.82  Strict scrutiny 
requires the statute be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental 
interest.83  The Court recognized, in previous opinions, First Amendment 
protection extended to corporations, stating “[t]he identity of the speaker is 
not decisive in determining whether speech is protected.  Corporations . . . 
like individuals, contribute to the ‘discussion, debate, and the dissemination 
of information and ideas’ that the First Amendment seeks to foster.”84 
In reconsidering its decision in Austin, the majority addressed three 
issues in the Austin opinion’s rationale.85  First, the Court looked to the 
governmental interest in limiting political speech created by Austin—the 
antidistortion rationale—which justified a prohibition of independent 
expenditures in order to prevent corporations from obtaining an “‘unfair 
advantage in the political marketplace’ by using ‘resources amassed in the 
economic marketplace.’”86  In tossing out the justification, the Court looked 
to its reasoning in Bellotti and Buckley, both of which ruled political speech 
affords First Amendment protection no matter the identity of the source—
be it individual, corporation, union, or association—and did not depend on 
 
79. Id. at 889. 
80. Id. at 892. 
81. Id. at 898 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976)). 
82. Id. (quoting Fed. Elections Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464 
(2007)). 
83. Id. 
84. Id. at 900 (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986)). 
85. Id. at 903. 
86. Id. at 904 (quoting Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659 (1990)). 
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the speaker’s “financial ability to engage in public discussion.”87  Further, 
because the law did not distinguish between corporations and media 
corporations, the Court observed the Austin rationale could produce the 
unintended consequence of a restriction on political speech by media corpo-
rations, in violation of the First Amendment.88  Thus, the Court held the 
antidistortion rationale of Austin invalid.89 
Next, the Court assessed the anticorruption interest provided in 
Austin.90  Again, the Court looked to its pre-Austin decision of Buckley, 
which found this governmental interest “sufficiently important,” but not 
enough to justify a ban on independent expenditures.91  Instead, preventing 
corruption or the appearance of corruption is a just interest in regulating 
direct contributions, as held in Buckley.92  The Citizens United opinion 
noted twenty-six states do not limit independent expenditures, and the 
government made no argument that corruption existed or appeared to exist 
in those states.93  Similarly, the Court acknowledged the McConnell record 
contained “over 100,000 pages . . . yet [did] not have any direct examples 
of votes being exchanged for . . . expenditures,”94 perhaps thereby recog-
nizing, in short, “if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” 
Finally, the Court rejected the Austin argument that limiting inde-
pendent expenditures protects a corporation’s shareholders who may carry 
dissimilar political views, but again the Court pointed to the government’s 
ability to bar the speech of media corporations, thereby finding no justifi-
cation within the First Amendment.95  Instead, the Court once again 
referenced the lack of abuse on record and suggested the problem was 
nothing that could not be resolved “through the procedures of corporate 
democracy.”96  Therefore, the Austin decision was abandoned, as well as 
the portion of McConnell that relied on the Austin antidistortion interest to 
uphold a more stringent restriction.97  Instead, the Court looked back thirty 
years and relied on its Buckley and Bellotti decisions.98 
 
87. Id. (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 49)). 
88. Id. at 905. 
89. Id. at 906. 
90. Id. at 908. 
91. Id. (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25). 
92. Id. 
93. Id. at 908-09. 
94. Id. at 910. 
95. Id. at 911. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at 913. 
98. Id. 
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Alternatively, the Court upheld the disclaimer and disclosure require-
ments of BCRA sections 201 and 311 as satisfactory means of regulating 
political speech.99  In an as applied challenge, the Court once again relied 
on Buckley and reasoned disclosures and disclaimers provide the electorate 
with information, thereby insuring that voters are conversant as to whom is 
providing support.100  These acts of transparency were justified as less 
restrictive alternative regulations of speech, for “[d]isclaimer and disclosure 
requirements may burden the ability to speak, but they ‘impose no ceiling 
on campaign-related activities,’ and ‘do not prevent anyone from speak-
ing.’”101  However, the Court cautioned, in the presence of threat, harass-
ment, or reprisal, such restrictions might be warranted if shown; in Citizens 
United, though, no such evidence existed.102 
B. CONCURRENCES 
Chief Justice Roberts, with whom Justice Alito joined, concurred, 
outlining his justification for straying from precedent.103  The Chief Justice 
powerfully noted, “[W]e must balance the importance of having constitu-
tional questions decided against the importance of having them decided 
right.”104  Importantly, the concurrence suggested it takes a “big court” to 
admit it erred in previous decisions, but to refrain from doing so would 
undermine the principle reason stare decisis exists.105 
Justice Scalia, along with Justice Alito and, in part, Justice Thomas, 
authored a separate concurrence, aimed directly at the dissenters’ apparent 
disdain for the First Amendment protection of corporations.106  In a cutting 
response, Justice Scalia referenced the dissent’s “corporation-hating quota-
tions[.]”107  Instead, Justice Scalia offered his own Originalist response that 
the dissent offered “no evidence—none whatever—that the First Amend-
ment’s unqualified text was originally understood to exclude such associa-
tional speech from its protection.”108  Seemingly proud of the majority, 
 
99. Id. at 914. 
100. Id. at 915. 
101. Id. at 914 (citing McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 201 (2003); 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976)). 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 917. 
104. Id. at 920. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. at 925 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
107. Id. 
108. Id. at 927. 
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Justice Scalia called for celebration rather than condemnation of the new 
addition of speech to public debate.109 
C. DISSENT 
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, 
issued a scathing response to the majority’s opinion in a ninety-page dis-
sent.110  Justice Stevens pointed to the majority’s apparent inaccurate classi-
fication of a corporation’s place in a constitutionally protected society.111  
He noted corporations, while valued contributors to society, are not actually 
members of it.112  Justice Stevens went so far as to mention that lawmakers 
might in fact have a constitutional duty to guard against undue corporate 
influence in election processes.113  Justice Stevens offered his own Origi-
nalist understanding of the role of corporations in the elections process, 
which Justice Scalia’s concurrence explicitly addressed.114  Justice Stevens 
referenced his understanding of the original role of corporations as “entities 
designed to serve a social function for the state.”115  The dissenter con-
tinued, “[I]t seems implausible that the Framers believed ‘the freedom of 
speech’ would extend equally to all corporate speakers, much less that it 
would preclude legislatures from taking limited measures to guard against 
corporate capture of elections.”116  Justice Stevens also disagreed with the 
majority’s interpretation that the challenged provisions were actually a “ban 
on corporate speech” at all, and instead opined the provisions are nothing of 
the sort.117  He reasoned, under Austin and McConnell, the availability of 
exemptions for separate segregated funds and the creation of political action 
committees provided sufficient opportunity to engage in the political 
process.118 
The dissent expressed at length its disappointment in the majority’s 
unnecessary stray from precedent, claiming Citizens United could have 
been resolved on narrower grounds.119  Particularly, the dissent pointed to 
interests of preventing corruption and the undue influence of corporations 
 
109. Id. at 929. 
110. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
111. Id. at 930. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 948. 
115. Id. at 949. 
116. Id. at 950. 
117. Id. at 942. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 933 (“The Court operates with a sledge hammer rather than a scalpel when it 
strikes down one of Congress’ most significant efforts to regulate the role that corporations and 
unions play in electoral politics.”). 
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as sufficient to uphold the restriction.120  Pointedly, Justice Stevens called 
out the majority’s activism:  “In the end, the Court’s rejection of Austin and 
McConnell comes down to nothing more than its disagreement with their 
results . . . .  The only relevant thing that has changed since Austin and 
McConnell is the composition of this Court.”121  Justice Stevens, in his 
opposition, did not suggest he had lost his faith in the body politic but 
instead expressed his concern for the integrity of the electoral process.122  
He suggested instead the electorate may make its most informed decision 
with the comfort and common sense that the integrity of the process is not 
corrupted by the undue influence of unlimited corporate wealth.123 
IV. IMPACT AND APPLICATION TO NORTH DAKOTA 
The landmark Supreme Court decision in Citizens United left the 
corporate political expenditure election laws of twenty-four states in ques-
tion.124  In North Dakota, the Citizens United decision likely invalidates 
certain provisions of the North Dakota Century Code, but leaves other 
election sections unaffected.125 
A. INDEPENDENT EXPENDITURES 
North Dakota Century Code section 16.1-08.1-03.3 provides, “A 
corporation, cooperative corporation, limited liability company, or associa-
tion may not make a direct contribution . . . [t]o aid any candidate for public 
office or for nomination to public office.”126  Specifically, North Dakota 
law defines “contribution” as: 
A gift, transfer, conveyance, provision, receipt, subscription, loan, 
advance, deposit of money, or anything of value, made for the pur-
pose of influencing the nomination for election, or election, of any 
person to public office or aiding or opposing the circulation or 
 
120. Id. at 961. 
121. Id. at 941-42. 
122. Id. at 931 (“The path [the Court] has taken to reach its outcome will, I fear, do damage 
to this institution.”). 
123. Id. at 979. The Court stated: 
At bottom, the Court’s opinion is thus a rejection of the common sense of the Ameri-
can people, who have recognized a need to prevent corporations from undermining 
self-government since the founding, and who have fought against the distinctive 
corrupting potential of corporate electioneering since the days of Theodore Roosevelt.  
It is a strange time to repudiate that common sense. 
Id. 
124. Life After Citizens United, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan. 4, 
2011), http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=19607. 
125. See N.D. CENT. CODE tit. 16.1 (2009) (concerning North Dakota state election law). 
126. Id. § 16.1-08.1-03.3(1)(c). 
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passage of a statewide initiative or referendum petition or 
measure . . . .127 
However, the North Dakota Century Code does not expressly address 
any amount of money spent in support or opposition of specific candidates, 
so long as the corporation operates independently of such candidates, politi-
cal organizations, or political parties, which makes the Citizens United 
decision relevant to North Dakota law and will likely shape necessary 
future legislation.128  No definitive distinction rests within the state law that 
distinguishes a “direct contribution,” banned by North Dakota statute, from 
an “independent expenditure,” upheld by the Court in Citizens United.129 
Unlike North Dakota state law, federal law makes the distinction be-
tween a direct contribution and an independent expenditure.130  The United 
States Code states an independent expenditure is one “expressly advocating 
the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate [and] is not made in 
concert or cooperation with or at the request or suggestion of such candi-
date, the candidate’s authorized political committee, or their agents, or a 
political party committee or its agents.”131  It is the “independent expendi-
ture” contribution that the Supreme Court expressly upheld as constitutional 
in Citizens United.132  Under Citizens United, the North Dakota statute, 
without first distinguishing between an “independent expenditure” and a 
“contribution” made directly to a candidate, a candidate’s organization, or 
political party, may not be constitutionally regulated by the state and will 
likely be found invalid.133 
As if the statutory waters were not already sufficiently murky, the 
North Dakota Century Code also prohibits corporations from making a 
direct contribution “[f]or any political purpose134 or the reimbursement or 
indemnification of any person for money or property so used.”135  This 
 
127. Id. § 16.1-08.1-01(3). 
128. See id. § 16.1-08.1-03.3 (explaining the current actions that are prohibited). 
129. Id. 
130. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(8), (17) (2006). 
131. Id. § 431(17)(A)-(B). 
132. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010). 
133. Id. 
134. The term “political purpose” is defined in the North Dakota Century Code as:   
[A]ny activity undertaken in support of or in opposition to the election or nomination 
of a candidate to public office and includes using “vote for”, “oppose”, or any similar 
support or opposition language in any advertisement whether the activity is undertaken 
by a candidate, a political committee, a political party, or any person. 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-08.1-01(10) (2009) (emphasis added).  For election law purposes, the 
North Dakota Century Code defines a “person” as “an individual, partnership, political committee, 
association, corporation, cooperative corporation, limited liability company, or other organization 
or group of persons.” Id. § 16.1-08.1-01(7) (emphasis added). 
135. Id. § 16.1-08.1-03.3(1)(d) (emphasis added). 
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section of the code, when applied to any political activity contributed to by 
any person, including a corporation,136 may be constitutionally invalid if 
that contribution was considered an “independent expenditure” as outlined 
in Citizens United, causing a questionable ambiguity between the two 
bodies of law.137 
Federal law classifies an independent expenditure by a corporation as 
one that expressly advocates the election or defeat of a candidate that is not 
made in cooperation with such candidate.138  In comparison, North 
Dakota’s statutory language prohibiting direct contributions for any politi-
cal purpose makes no mention of coordination with a candidate.139  Instead, 
it suggests that current state law prohibits the very actions upheld by the 
court in Citizens United, leaving this provision ambiguous and potentially 
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.140  Alternatively, the “direct 
contribution” language in section 16.1-08.1-03.3 may insinuate the law 
excludes an independent expenditure.141  Thus, the greatest impact on North 
Dakota election law as a result of the Citizens United opinion rests upon a 
determination of whether the statute’s language, which bars contributions 
that “aid” any candidate or are made for “political purposes,” in fact desig-
nates an independent expenditure or simply a direct contribution to the 
candidate or candidate’s committee.142 
It is important to observe that the Supreme Court in Citizens United did 
not address a ban on corporations contributing directly to or in coordination 
with candidates and political organizations and parties, but the Court has 
ruled in separate decisions that such prohibitions found in the BCRA are 
constitutional.143  In North Dakota, if section 16.1-08.1-03.3 of the code’s 
present language, stating a corporation is prohibited from making a direct 
contribution to “aid any candidate . . . for any political purpose,” was to be 
interpreted as a direct contribution distinguished from an independent 
expenditure, such a regulation would be upheld under both North Dakota 
and federal law.144 
 
136. Id. 
137. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913. 
138. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (2006) (defining “independent expenditure”). 
139. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-08.1-01(7) (describing activity in support or opposition of 
a candidate in an advertisement when the activity is assumed by any person). 
140. Id. § 16.1-08.1-03.3. 
141. Id. 
142. See id. ch. 16.1-08.1 (regarding campaign contribution statements). 
143. See generally Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); 
McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) 
(ruling direct contributions by corporations may be regulated to protect quid pro quo corruption). 
144. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-08.1-03.3(1); see 2 U.S.C. § 431(17) (2006) (defining “inde-
pendent expenditure”). 
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In order to remain consistent with the holding of Citizens United, it is 
likely necessary under North Dakota law to clarify or distinguish the 
extent—or lack thereof—to which corporations may make independent 
expenditures and direct political contributions by a separate statute.145  As it 
presently reads, the state’s prohibition on corporations making any direct 
contribution for a political purpose, which includes advertisements under-
taken by persons as defined in the code, cannot be administered constitu-
tionally under Citizens United and should be amended as necessary.146 
B. REGIONAL ELECTION LAW COMPARISON 
While North Dakota does not distinguish an “independent expenditure” 
from a “contribution” by a corporation by statute, various other states’ elec-
tion codes make the distinction.147  South Dakota’s election statute does not 
expressly permit or prohibit corporate independent expenditures, but does 
provide a distinct definition of such contributions.148  South Dakota election 
law provides an independent expenditure is one that is made: 
To expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified 
candidate or the placement of a ballot question on the ballot or the 
adoption or defeat of any ballot question, but which is not made to, 
controlled by, coordinated with, requested by, or made upon con-
sultation with a candidate, political committee, or agent of a candi-
date or political committee.149 
Alternatively, in South Dakota, direct contributions by corporations are 
prohibited by distinct statutory language not found in North Dakota law.150  
Section 12-27-18 of South Dakota law states, “No organization151 may 
make a contribution to a candidate committee, political action committee, 
or political party.”152  This simple distinction prohibiting contributions 
made directly “to a” political entity is absent in North Dakota law, but 
 
145. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-08.1-01. 
146. See id.; Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913 (upholding a federal ban on independent 
political expenditures by corporations). 
147. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-08.1-03.3. But cf. IOWA CODE § 68A.404(1) (2010); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 12-27-1(11) (Supp. 2010); 2010 Minn. Laws 1564-65. 
148. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-27-1(11). 
149. Id. 
150. Id. § 12-27-18. But see N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-08.1-03.3 (concerning prohibitions on 
political contributions by corporations). 
151. In South Dakota, “organization” includes “any business corporation, limited liability 
company, nonprofit corporation, limited liability partnership, limited partnership, partnership, 
cooperative . . . .” S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-27-1(16). 
152. Id. § 12-27-18 (emphasis added). 
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yields a compliant prohibition on contributions in South Dakota under 
federal law.153 
Similarly, current Minnesota law expressly authorizes corporate inde-
pendent expenditures while prohibiting direct or indirect contributions.154  
In allowing independent expenditures, Minnesota law states, “A corporation 
may not make an expenditure . . . to promote or defeat the candidacy of an 
individual for nomination, election, or appointment to a political office, 
unless the expenditure is an independent expenditure.”155  As a legislative 
response to Citizens United, Minnesota law additionally requires any corpo-
ration wishing to make an independent expenditure to form and register an 
“independent expenditure political fund”156 if the expenditure is greater 
than one hundred dollars.157  In contrast, Minnesota law still independently 
prohibits direct contributions, dictating “[a] corporation may not make a 
contribution . . . directly or indirectly . . . to a major political party, organi-
zation, committee, or individual to promote or defeat the candidacy of an 
individual for nomination, election, or appointment to a political office.”158 
Iowa’s election law takes a similar approach, restricting direct corpo-
rate political contributions.159  Per Iowa statute, an insurance company, 
savings and loan association, bank, credit union, or corporation shall not 
make a monetary or in-kind contribution to a candidate or committee except 
for a ballot issue committee.160  While Iowa law clearly bars direct contri-
butions by corporations, like those statutes found in South Dakota and 
Minnesota, its statutory permission of independent expenditures is dis-
tinct.161  Iowa law requires “[a]n entity . . . shall not make an independent 
expenditure162 . . . without the authorization of a majority of the entity’s 
 
153. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 908 (2010); see S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 12-27-18 (Supp. 2010). But see N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-08.1-03.3 (lacking 
distinct language as to whom contributions may or may not be made). 
154. See 2010 Minn. Laws 1565 (amending MINN. STAT. §§ 211B.15(2), (3) (2005)). 
155. Id. 
156. An “independent expenditure political fund” is a political fund that makes only 
independent expenditures and disbursements permitted under section 10A.121, subdivision 1. 
MINN. STAT. § 10A.12(1)(a).  Revised Minnesota law permits expenditures to pay costs associ-
ated with fundraising and general operations, pay for communications that do not constitute 
contributions or approved expenditures, and make contributions to other independent expenditure 
political committees or independent expenditure political funds. 2010 Minn. Laws 1565. 
157. MINN. STAT. § 10A.12(1)(a); see supra note 124. 
158. 2010 Minn. Laws 1564 (amending MINN. STAT. § 211B.15(2)). 
159. See IOWA CODE § 68A.503 (Supp. 2010). 
160. Id. § 68A.503(1). 
161. Compare id., with 2010 Minn. Laws 1564-65 and S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-27-1(11) 
(Supp. 2010). 
162. For election law purposes, Iowa statute defines “independent expenditure” as “one or 
more expenditures . . . for a communication that expressly advocates . . . [a] candidate . . . without 
the prior approval or coordination with a candidate . . . .” IOWA CODE § 68A.404(1). 
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board of directors, executive council, or similar organizational leadership 
body of the use of treasury funds for an independent expenditure involving 
a candidate or ballot issue committee.”163  The Iowa statute, amended in 
2010 as a result of the Citizens United decision, meets the decision’s 
requirements by allowing a corporation to make independent expenditures 
but takes the furthest action of those addressed by creating an additional 
restriction requiring a majority of an entity’s governing body to authorize 
such expenditures.164 
State laws found in South Dakota, Minnesota, and Iowa each required 
revision as a result of the Citizens United decision.165  Though each state 
reversed old law barring independent expenditures by corporations, South 
Dakota, Minnesota, and Iowa all took a different approach to the level of 
regulation each state now requires of such expenditures.166  No matter the 
extent to which North Dakota may choose to regulate independent political 
expenditures by corporations, some statutory distinction must be made for 
its laws to remain constitutionally enforceable.167 
C. DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT OF EXPENDITURES 
The campaign finance disclosure statement requirements outlined by 
section 16.1-08.1-04.1 of the North Dakota Century Code will likely remain 
unchanged as a result of Citizens United because the Supreme Court upheld 
such requirements as constitutional.168  While no provision requiring the 
disclosure of direct contributions to candidates by corporations169 or of in-
dependent expenditures for political purposes170 exists under current North 
Dakota law, the introduction of such a disclosure requirement is likely 
needed if a distinction between a direct contribution and an independent 
expenditure is made.171  The Citizens United decision does not prohibit 
corporations from establishing a “separate segregated fund” or political 
 
163. Id. § 68A.404(2)(a). 
164. Id.; cf. MINN. STAT. § 211B.15(3) (2008) (amending previous campaign law in response 
to Citizens United); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 12-27-1(11) (amending previous campaign law in 
response to Citizens United). 
165. See supra note 124. 
166. Id. 
167. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-08.1-03.3 (2009). 
168. Id. § 16.1-10-04.1; see Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 914-
15 (2010) (upholding political advertisement disclosure and disclaimer requirements). 
169. The North Dakota Century Code prohibits direct contributions in section 16.1-08.1-
03.3, thus no disclosure requirement is currently necessary. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-08.1-
03.3. 
170. North Dakota statute currently makes no reference to corporate independent expen-
ditures. See id. ch. 16.1-08.1. 
171. See id. (concerning campaign contribution statements). 
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action committee to expressly advocate a particular candidate with direct 
contributions,172 and consequently, the analogous North Dakota statute will 
likely remain unchanged.173  North Dakota Century Code section 16.1-08.1-
03.3(2) expressly permits the “establishment, administration, and solicita-
tion of contributions to a separate and segregated fund to be utilized for 
political purposes by a corporation, cooperative corporation, limited liabil-
ity company, or association.”174  Political action committees175 maintain the 
ability to make contributions to candidates and other political committees 
and to coordinate any independent expenditure with candidates and political 
committees for political purposes.176 
Once established for the purpose of administering a segregated fund for 
political purposes, the North Dakota Century Code requires all political 
action committees to disclose any contribution in an aggregate amount in 
excess of two hundred dollars to the Secretary of State.177  The disclosure 
statement, by statute, requires the name and mailing address of each 
contributor and must include the date the contribution was made and the 
date the contribution was received during each reporting period, and again 
in a year-end statement that in duration covers the entire calendar year.178  
Such disclosure statement requirements remain constitutional under 
Citizens United, and the requisite statute in North Dakota will likely remain 
unaffected.179 
D. DISCLAIMER REQUIREMENT FOR ADVERTISEMENTS 
Because Citizens United upheld the requirement that an advertisement 
or communication for political purposes includes a disclaimer that identifies 
the person or group who is financially responsible for it as constitutional, 
the provisions outlined by the North Dakota Century Code that require the 
same will likely remain intact.180  North Dakota Century Code section 16.1-
10-04.1 contains a disclosure requirement that necessitates certain political 
advertisements to identify the sponsor.181  Because North Dakota law 
 
172. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 881 (syllabus). 
173. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-08.1-03.3(2). 
174. Id. 
175. “Political committee” includes any committee, club, association, or other group of 
persons which receives contributions or makes expenditures for political purposes. Id. § 16.1-
08.1-01(8)(a). 
176. Id. § 16.1-08.1-03.3(2). 
177. Id. § 16.1-08.1-03.3(3). 
178. Id. 
179. Id.; see Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 914-15 (2010) 
(upholding BCRA’s disclaimer and disclosure provisions as applied). 
180. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-10-04.1; Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 914-15. 
181. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-10-04.1.  Specifically, it requires: 
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considers corporations to be “persons” by statute,182 section 16.1-10-04.1 
may constitutionally apply to a corporation if it distributes and funds a 
political advertisement as an independent expenditure for or against a 
candidate.183  Of course, current North Dakota law prohibits corporations 
from making any direct contribution to aid any candidate or for any 
political purpose in general, so it is plausible that corporate expenditures of 
this nature were not originally intended to be included within the reach of 
the statute requiring disclaimers.184  However, it is likely that North Dakota 
must make election law revisions that include the extent to which corpora-
tions may make independent expenditures, and doing so may subject such 
expenditures to the general disclaimer requirements outlined in section 
16.1-10-04.1.185  Thus, in order to avoid any further ambiguity, it would be 
appropriate to amend the North Dakota Century Code by explicitly extend-
ing the disclaimer requirements in section 16.1-10-04.1 to corporations, 
cooperative corporations, and limited liability companies, with distinct lan-
guage pertaining to independent political expenditures.186 
President Obama, in his 2010 State of the Union Address, echoed 
Justice Stevens and the dissenters’ sentiment.187  In his speech, the 
President sternly stated, “I don’t think American elections should be bank-
rolled by America’s most powerful interests,” and further criticized the 
majority, noting the decision would “open the floodgates for special 
interest—including foreign corporations—to spend without limit in our 
elections.”188  Thus, the citizens are divided.  Justice Kennedy’s majority 
submitted the power of the electorate rests with the ability of voters to make 
informed decisions.189  The unrestricted ability of corporations to make 
independent political expenditures and attachment of a strict disclosure 
 
Every political advertisement . . . designed to assist, injure, or defeat the candidate by 
reflecting upon the candidate’s personal character or political action . . . must disclose 
on the advertisement the name of the person . . . paying for the advertisement. 
Id.  The statute further states, “The name of the person paying for any radio or television broadcast 
containing any advertising announcement for or against any candidate for public office must be 
announced at the close of the broadcast.” Id. 
182. “Person” is defined as an “individual, partnership, political committee, association, 
corporation, cooperative corporation, limited liability company, or other organization or group of 
persons.” Id. § 16.1-08.1-01(7). 
183. Id. § 16.1-10-04.1. 
184. Id. § 16.1-08.1-03.3. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. 
187. 156 CONG. REC. 418 (2010). 
188. Id. 
189. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 908 (2010) (concluding “[t]he 
First Amendment confirms the freedom to think for ourselves”); id. at 899 (observing “it is 
inherent in the nature of the political process that voters must be free to obtain information from 
diverse sources in order to determine how to cast their votes”). 
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requirement do not prevent citizens from making a learned decision, but 
instead empowers them to do so.190  The constitutional attachment of a dis-
claimer or disclosure to corporate advocacy, with which the dissent did not 
object,191 furthered this reasoning.192 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Citizens United, the United States Supreme Court overturned its 
decisions in Austin and McConnell, thereby lifting the restriction on inde-
pendent political expenditures by corporations.193  In addition, the Court 
upheld the disclosure and disclaimer requirements pertaining to such expen-
ditures.194  The Citizens United decision unearths a number of ambiguities 
in the North Dakota Century Code relating to First Amendment constitu-
tionality that need to be addressed and amended in the near future.195 
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190. Id. at 907 (“By suppressing the speech of manifold corporations . . . the Government 
prevents their voices and viewpoints from reaching the public and advising voters on which 
persons or entities are hostile to their interests.”).  “Factions should be checked by permitting them 
all to speak, and by entrusting the people to judge what is true and what is false.” Id. (quoting 
JAMES MADISON, THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossitor ed., 1961)). 
191. See id. at 929 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
192. Id. at 915 (quoting First Nat’l Bank v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792 (1978)). “Identifica-
tion of the source of advertising may be required as a means of disclosure, so that the people will 
be able to evaluate the arguments to which they are being subjected.” Id. at 915.  See also id. at 
916 (“The First Amendment protects political speech; and disclosure permits citizens and share-
holders to react to the speech of corporate entities in a proper way.  This transparency enables the 
electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and 
messages.”). 
193. Id. at 913. 
194. Id. at 916. 
195. See discussion supra Part IV (discussing Citizens United’s impact on North Dakota 
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